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Prof.Michael Baram:
1. This panel will discuss intellectual property - the patent incentive,
patentability issues, licensing, and litigation-related matters. It will be
moderated by Dr. Ashley Stevens, the Director of the Office of Technology
Transfer at Boston University. Ashley has multiple degrees, including a
doctorate in physical chemistry from Oxford University. He has worked in the
biotech industry for a number of years, mostly with startup companies and
academic research organizations such as the Dana Farber Cancer Institute,
where he was also Director of Technology Transfer. Ashley was instrumental
in the startup and operations of firms such as Biotechnica International, and
started his career at Procter & Gamble. He serves on a number of scientific
advisory boards and is known for his work on early-stage technology
evaluation and industry-university strategic alliances. He is also a mentor to
many of us here at the law school.
Dr. Ashley Stevens:
2. Thank you. Professor Yarmush gave us a very nice segue into this
session.' A good way of telling when trends are going from the fringes into the
' See Joyce Wong et al., Advances in Biomaterials& Devices, & Their Financing,6 B.U.

6 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 3
mainstream is to read the Sunday cartoons. For example, it was in 1991 or
1992, when the Internet was just getting started and you started seeing cartoons
about e-mail, you knew that this was going to be very important and was
starting to take off. I wish I had brought with me a cartoon that ran about a
month ago in the Sunday Boston Globe in which a grade school teacher has
little kids sitting on the ground around her. The teacher is saying, "Class,
today's lesson on 'sharing' has been cancelled and will be replaced with a
lesson titled 'Intellectual Property Protection."' Clearly, as we move more and
more into a knowledge-based economy, intellectual property protection is
becoming more and more important.
3. To put this session on intellectual property protection into perspective,
clearly in these high-tech fields intellectual property protection is critical to
investment. Rufus King talked about good technology, but he didn't say
exactly what that meant. 2 I think he meant two things. Obviously, the
technology has to work. Second, it has to be protected.
4. Second, I observe that the medical devices industry, as Professor
Yarmush observed, is a litigious industry. 3 If you look at the financials of the
major device companies, not every year but periodically, you will see blips of
ten- to hundred- million dollar settlements of patent infringement litigation.
5. I think intellectual property in this industry presents particular
challenges. It is unlike pharmaceuticals, where you go through a ten-year
development and regulatory approval process, and then sell that drug until the
day its patent expires, at which time you will hand it over gracefully to the
generic companies. The medical device industry tends to be an industry of
relatively short product life cycles. You need to get your intellectual property
in place while it still has value. The final challenge that you face is that there
are two patent systems worldwide. The U.S. patent system operates on a first
to invent basis; the worldwide system is first to file. Since the device industry
is a worldwide industry, it is particularly challenging to get your products out
there and protected on a worldwide basis. With that, I will introduce the first
speaker.
6. Thomas Meyers is a partner at Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault and a
member of their Intellectual Property Practice Group. He focuses on advising
clients in all areas of intellectual property law with particular emphasis on
biotechnology and chemical patent prosecution, licensing, interference and
opposition. He received his B.S. from the University of Illinois in 1982, and
his J.D. from Northwestern in 1991.
Thomas Meyers:
7. Thank you. I want to pick up where the last panel left off by telling a
story about a panel I sat on about a year and a half ago at the organization that
J. Sci. & TECH. L. 2,

See id. 66.
' See id. 93.
2

26-41 (2000).

PATENT RIGHTS AND LICENSING

does continuing education for lawyers in Massachusetts, the MCLE. They had
an all-day patent course that was attended by about fifty percent lawyers and
fifty percent non-lawyers. The course was designed to teach us about the basic
nuts-and-bolts of patenting in different areas such as biotechnology, chemistry,
electrical engineering, and software. There were about one hundred to one
hundred and fifty people attending. We had a wonderful program set up, with
a district court judge making the keynote speech at lunch. In the afternoon,
there were a number of satellite programs. I was on the panel of the only
biotech program on the menu that people could choose from. Of the 150
people in attendance, a total of six showed up for the biotech panel. Three of
them were from my firm. One of the people who attended was a head hunter
who thought that the panel was on artificial intelligence. She was looking for
software engineers to be patent lawyers.
8. The reason I tell this story now is that today we have a program
dedicated soley to biotech, and about 150 people signed up for today's
program. I only see one or two people from my firm. I think that gives you a
comparison to gauge the interest in biotechnology and that supports what we
see in our practice.
9. We represent a number of biotech companies and biomaterials
companies. Over the last year or year and a half, we've seen more interest in
patenting. We use patenting to gauge the amount of money that is going into
biotechnology. The increase has been encouraging for all of us who have been
wondering what we were going to do, or whether we would be doing software
patents for the rest of our lives, or whether we were going to have enough
biotechnology work. I think the answer is that there is an upswing in the
biotech industry. What I want to talk about today is how people in the biotech
industry generally protect their investments, and then I want to focus
specifically on biomaterials.
10. What are the kinds of things that people are trying to patent these
days? Why do they want patents in the first place? What are some of the
pitfalls that people run into in trying to obtain protection for their intellectual
property? Most of the people here today are not patent lawyers, and I have
been in an audience where a patent lawyer gets up and spends twenty minutes
on the minutiae of § 102 of the Patent Act, 4 which is boring. I do want to
mention two key points for people who are not patent lawyers.
11. First, a patent does not give you the right to do anything except sue
people who are infringing the patent. The patent is a right to exclude others
from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing that which is
claimed in the patent. Keep in mind that a patent does not give you the right to
do anything, it just gives you the right to prevent other people from doing
things. Second, it is the patent's claims that count. The claim is analogous to
the deed on your real property that says that the property extends so far to the
North, so far to the East, and to the West. Your patent claims define the limits
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of the intellectual property right that you want to exclude other people from.
We will talk a little bit about why that is important when we get into more of
the details from this particular area.
12. What are people trying to patent in the area of biomaterials? It is
divided into two sub-areas. One sub-area is biotech devices or medical
devices. I am not going to spend a lot of time talking about medical devices,
but that group includes things like stents, catheters, and other things that
surgeons and physicians use in treating illness. These are examples of medical
devices, and medical devices have been around a long time. They are really a
different animal than biomaterials. Economically, it is an actual product that
you are selling. Typically, a little tweak here or there will take you outside
someone else's patent protection. While there is a lot of patent activity going
on in this area, medical device patents are not really going to be the focus of
my comments today.
13. My comments will be more geared towards the area that was addressed
by the first panel - biomaterials and the interplay between biomaterials and
genomics. This is really a hot, new area in biotech right now. We are getting
more calls from genomics companies or people interested in genomics patents.
Second only to the calls on genomics are calls of people who are interested in
organ regeneration, repair, and reconstruction.
There is some interplay
between the two but what I want to focus on is the former, the biomaterials,
bioengineering aspects of biotechnology.
14. What are people trying to patent?
We have seen patents on
scaffoldings and matrices to grow new tissue or to repair damaged tissue.
There are two aspects of matrices, cellular and acellular, and the one you use
will depending on whether you want the body to seed the matrix itself or
whether you have seeded that matrix ex vivo. You want to put it in as a
scaffolding to grow new tissue, the scaffolding being sort of an architecture
around which you want to grow, for example, a new kidney or a new bladder.
15. People are trying to patent the artificial organs themselves. This leads
to some of the problems that I will discuss in a few moments in terms of
enforceability and for what you can get patents (or get paid, for that matter).
People are trying to patent methods of repairing damaged tissue and methods
for replacing dysfunctional organs. By dysfunctional organs, I mean an organ
that is there and working, however it is not producing the right enzymes. An
example would be a pancreas that is not producing insulin. This sort of
dovetails with the gene therapy area that has been in the press lately, but has
not shown the promise that we had hoped for a few years ago.
16. People have also attempted, and received, patents on growth factors.
Instead of trying to repair tissue that is damaged, or instead of replacing an
organ that is not working very well, people are trying to inject growth factors
and get the body to turn itself around. A patient might be missing a kidney,
and there may be a growth factor that can be injected that will grow a kidney.
While it is never that simple, and no one has been able to develop something
like this, people have had some success in the area of bone regeneration and
cardiac regeneration using growth factors, at least in the laboratory.
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17. What good are patents in this area? Why do people want patents?
Clients call us wanting to patent some idea. We often have to stand back and
ask if they really want a patent for what they have said they want a patent on.
How is this patent going to protect this business? What is it going to do for
their company? Are they going to be able to get economic value out of it?
18. These are some of the issues that we think about when analyzing the
economic value from patents. First, we work with a lot of startup companies.
I think for startup companies, the economic value is that patents help create the
illusion of value that you need to attract funding. Venture capitalists, in our
experience, are typically impressed with somebody who comes in and says that
he has forty-two patents. We perform due diligence often on companies that
our clients are thinking about investing in. Sometimes, we look at those fortytwo patents and find out that only two of them really relate to the business.
The rest of them are either on the fringes, do not exist anymore, or maybe the
company never paid the right fees. However, just having the patents attracts
investment and notice. If a company has forty-two patents on an artificial
kidney, it must be doing something right.
19. Second, patents keep people out of your space. Patents create a barrier
to entry so that you can develop your technology in the quiet of your
laboratory, without having to worry about people bothering your product
market. As an analogy, think of learning how to shoot free throws in a
situation where there are all kinds of people coming onto the court and waving
their hands in your face. If you had the patent on that court, nobody can come
in, and you can learn to shoot free throws in privacy (and learn to do it quite
well).
20. Third, obtaining an economic advantage in the marketplace is very
competitive right now. It is a crowded field, especially in the area of
biomaterials. Everybody wants to get in. You want to carve out a niche for
yourself, not only to give yourself time to develop the products that you want
to develop, but also in the economy going forward. Who are your customers
going to be? Who are you going to eventually sell to? Even biotech companies
should be thinking about these questions. Eventually biotech companies are
going to come up with products, and they will have to get revenues, and there
may no longer be a royalty stream. You will look at licensing and hooking up
with big pharmaceutical companies. It may be a while, but the trend is going
that way, especially in the pharmacogenomics areas that are cropping up. We
are seeing a lot of activity not only on the venture capital side, but also on the
patent side, which to us is a good economic indicator.
21. It is still a good idea if you are starting a company to call it
organsareus.com because you will get some investment just by doing that. But
it is not so important as it was. Compare the billions of dollars flowing into the
IT companies and hundreds of millions into the biotech companies. However,
the biotech companies are on the upswing. Hopefully we will be back to the
situation, like not too long ago, where there was substantial interest in biotech.
We will be able to fulfill the promise this time of coming up with some actual
products, and actual methods, that will service the medical industry and
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promote biotech better. Getting patents is not just a way for lawyers to make
5
money. That is my response to Dr. Yarmush.
22. What are the pitfalls in this area? I can spend the next hour talking
about all of the bad things that can happen to you, but I only have an
additional seven minutes. I will try to streamline the pitfalls. However, I
think that the pitfalls in this particular area are different then they are in other
areas, even biotechnology. The principle reason for the differences is the
medical activity exemption, which occurs when a doctor performs a medical
procedure on a patient and in doing so infringes a method patent. The doctor is
still an infringer. The common misconception is that the doctor has not
infringed, but the doctor has. There is no remedy for that infringement under
the Patent Act.
23. For example, take a company that invents and patents many wonderful
method patents. One patented method is replacing a defective heart, and
comprises of the steps of removing the defective heart and replacing it with a
good heart. The patent might not be worth much because if a doctor performs
that medical procedure, he or she is infringing your patent but there are no
damages. You can not stop the doctor with an injunction, and you cannot get
attorney's fees if you sue the doctor. These are the remedies that you normally
get against another for patent infringement.
24. To clarify, when you have a patent, and you think somebody is
infringing that patent, typically you want to sue them. You want to say to
them: "Stop. Stop doing what you're doing." That is an injunction. But when
you say: "Hey! I could have made the six hundred million dollars you made off
your infringing product and I want that money back from you," that is asking
for damages. Typically, you would go in and ask for your attorney's fees as
well. You want the other side to pay your lawyers.
25. You cannot get either of those remedies when you are dealing with
doctors and related health care organizations. You cannot sue the doctor. You
cannot sue the HMO. You cannot sue the doctor's employer. This is a
problem. You should think about these problems when you are considering
which type of patents you want.
26. The medical activity exemption does not get doctors out of
infringement of device patents, however. If I have a patent on the artificial
heart, the doctor is not infringing my method patent by performing the
procedure, but has infringed my artificial heart patent, and he or she is on the
hook for that. This is one thing you do when trying to get around the
exemption.
27. The exemption exists because we as a society have decided that we
want to promote treatment of sick people, and we want to give medical doctors
an opportunity to heal people if that opportunity is available. The National
Institutes of Health ("NIH") thinks the exemption is great, and I do not
completely disagree with them.
However, we still want to promote

' See Wong et al., supra note 1, 93.
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technology. I like to tell people that the patent system is the only business
right which is specifically enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, which gives the
Congress the right to establish the patent system. 6 Congress responded by
saying, "all right, we'll give you this exclusive right to your invention for a
period of years so you can keep people out of your space, attract investment,
and get all the value from your invention for a period of years. However, in
exchange you have to tell us everything. You must disclose everything to the
public." The purpose of disclosure is to promote technology and push
technology forward. We have a desire to push technology further. We want
people to develop artificial organs. We want people to develop ways to repair
damaged tissue. Yet at the same time we want people to have treatment
available to them when they have a problem. The exemption was the
compromise.
28. Similar problems exist with enforceability. How do you enforce a
patent to a medical procedure, to a method? How do you enforce a patent that
claims an artificial kidney? What do you do? Do you go after the person with
the artificial kidney? That is not going to look good. It is bad public relations
if you sue the poor kidney recipient who would have died without the
procedure. Do you sue the doctor who used the kidney? Take ten doctors and
their combined net worth is probably not enough to make it worthwhile. So,
you cannot sue the doctor. What do you do?
29. You look to the manufacturer. You still want your method patents.
You still want your device patents, but you look for infringement damages
from the manufacturer. You look for inducement to infringe. You look for
contributory infringement. You are telling the manufacturer of the artificial
heart (while this is an absurd example it is easy to visualize) that you gave this
artificial heart to this doctor to put in this person. You, the manufacturer, knew
that there was only one purpose for an artificial heart - to replace the damaged
heart. Thus, you induced that person to infringe. You, the manufacturer,
contributed to the doctor's infringement. Therefore you are on the hook, and
we want damages from you. We would want an injunction to stop you from
doing what you are doing - making the artificial heart. Those enforceability
problems, I think, are unique in this area, because you have public relations
problems (you cannot go after the direct infringer sometimes), and you have to
build your patent portfolio, or your intellectual property estate, around those
concerns. You still try to get value out of it.
30. This is where patent lawyers come in. Patent lawyers work with you
trying to derive the economic value from your business plan going forward,
and figuring where you want to go, and how you are going to protect your
assets in the future.
31. A couple of additional thoughts. It is almost always necessary that a
company, especially a start-up, has multiple patents to protect whatever the
company sees as its business focus. You need multiple patents because other
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companies can design around your patent claims, and they will figure out a
better way to do it that does not infringe your patent. Take for example the
polymerase chain reaction ("PCR") patents. PCR was a revolution in
biotechnology in the late 1980s. Originally, there were three, but I think it is
now up to seven or eight. They keep getting more to try to keep extending the
protection. More than one patent is almost always necessary. You want to
view the intellectual property landscape as a fence around your real property.
It is a brick fence and there are always holes in the fence, and you want to keep
putting bricks in the holes to keep people out until you get a solid fence.
People hardly ever achieve that, but that is the aim. Second, you want to
consider alternatives to traditional patenting. Alternatives may be cheaper and
could provide, in some cases, better protection for your business.
32. I can think of two ways that people have traditionally used alternatives
to patenting to provide protection. First, companies used disposables. A
number of our clients' business models revolve around a big fancy machine.
You basically give the machine away, and then you patent the disposables
necessary for the machine. You charge people an arm and a leg for the
disposable. Now that a customer has the big fancy machine, they have to buy
the disposables from your company. This is a good alternative to the
straightforward patenting strategy one typically thinks of first.
33. Second, you consider design patents when you are talking about device
work, medical device work, even biological devices. Here, you patent the way
something works. This is useful if there is really no other way to do it that is
compatible with the procedure that you are performing, or the procedure that
people will be performing. Design patents, which are typically considered not
worthwhile, can go a long way in protecting you. You have to be a little
creative in today's landscape because there are so many competitors out there.
It is such a crowded field and people are litigious and smart. Few twenty year
olds are designing medical devices. However, there are a lot of thirty-five and
forty-year olds, who have experience, and who can come up with something
maybe in an hour or two to design around what you think is your cornerstone
technology. You must keep pushing forward. You must be creative and think
of multiple ways to protect your technology. The protection is out there, and
the patent system is an important cog in that machine.
34. I will leave you with that thought. Thank you.
Dr. Ashley Stevens:
35. Thank you, Tom. Our next speaker is Michael Meurer, who joined the
faculty of the Boston University School of Law last fall. Before that, he taught
law at the University of Buffalo, and economics at Duke University. He has
both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Minnesota. He
spent a year at Yale Law School as an Olin Faculty Fellow and a year at
AT&T Bell Labs as a Post-Doctoral Fellow. At Boston University he teaches
in the areas of intellectual property law, antitrust, and law and economics.
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Prof.Michael Meurer:
36. Thanks, Ashley. Dean Cass this morning told us that he was interested
in biomaterials because of the potential for hair regeneration. I share that
interest, and I think that I probably share his knowledge of biomaterials. That
might sound discouraging, but I think I do have something interesting and
useful to tell you. Instead of talking about the future of biomaterials, I want to
talk about the recent past of related fields; namely the impact that patents have
had on the biotech and pharmaceutical industries. The first question I want to
talk about is the ethical issues that relate to the pursuit of patents and the
impact that it has had on the biotech industry. Second, I want to talk about
organizational forms in biotech and the essential need for collaboration
between different kinds of organizational forms. I will discuss the impact that
patents have had at universities, small firms, and big firms, and how the three
interrelate. Finally, I want to talk about biotech patent litigation history.
37. In terms of ethical issues, the market incentive that is created by the
pursuit of patents does not really create new ethical problems but it may
aggravate problems that already exist. You need to pay attention to two kinds
of problems: first, you have look at issues of informed consent. Second, you
want to look at the impact of pursuit of patents on the culture of science. With
regard to informed consent there are a couple of topics, actually many topics,
that I think are important here, but there are specifically two that I want to tell
you about right now. The first one is well represented by the case of Moore v.
Regents of California,7 which is famous in first-year property classes and from
an episode of L.A. Law. It is a case that had to do with harvesting of cells from
a patient without that patient's knowledge. The cell line ended up being turned
into a valuable patent right. The second topic that I want to talk about is
experimentation designed to refine patented technology. In the medical area
there are questions of informed consent intertwined with questions of patent
law.
38. The Moore case involved a patient suffering from hairy-cell leukemia.
His spleen cells were harvested and cultured, which produced the Mo cell line.
The cell line was patented, and those patent rights ended up yielding fifteen
million dollars for Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corporation, and there is an
estimated three billion dollars worth of drugs that followed from it.
39. The California Supreme Court considered the issue of whether or not
Moore had a property right to the cells that were excised from his body. He
brought a conversion action against the researchers that were involved, but the
California Supreme Court declined to find that Moore enjoyed a property right
to the cell line. Alternatively, though, he was able to succeed in a tort claim,
claiming that the doctors had not informed him fully of the nature of the
procedure, specifically, that they had not informed him that the cell line was
potentially useful for biomedical research.
40. Informed consent issues are prominent with regard to biomaterials
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derived from embryonic stem-cell research. The NIH has recently come out
with guidelines that talk about what kind of informed consent is required in
that area.8 There is danger that researchers who are looking for attractive
target cells to start cell lines, leading to patents and other kinds of valuable
commercial property, will overlook the need to obtain informed consent from
patients. So, be on guard. Make sure that your clients or your people are
complying with informed consent requirements in this area.
41. The other potential problem arises from Section 102(b) of the Patent
Act. 9 That section gives rise to something called the statutory bar, which says
that you must apply for a patent pretty quickly if you take steps to
commercialize or publicize an invention; you could end up invalidating your
patent because of that activity. Specifically, one common kind of problem is
public use. We want to make sure that public use does not create a danger of
detrimental reliance by third parties who see some kind of technology they
think is in the public domain and then start to use it. We cut some slack to
inventors though by including an experimental use exemption within that
doctrine. There was a case involving an orthodontist who experimented with a
dental appliance and the Federal Circuit applauded the orthodontist for his
efforts to maintain the secrecy of the appliance.10 Unfortunately, the secrecy
extended to his patients; they were not informed that an experimental device
had been implanted in their mouths. The statutory bar creates an incentive to
keep the information secret, but you have to pay attention to your ethical
obligations; obligations which could turn into legal problems as well as ethical
problems.
42. Besides concern about informed consent, you should also think about
the implications of the pursuit of patents for your relationships with the
academic community. Smart managers in the pharmaceutical industry and
especially biotech firms are aware of the importance of bridges with the
academic community. Many scientists chafe under concerns about trade
secrecy and restrictions on academic publication in a commercial setting.
Companies suffer if they depart too much from the academic organizational
model of science because they might lose their best scientific employees.
Besides problems from too much secrecy, biotech firms should also be mindful
of the dangers of trade secret infringement. There was a case in which a
11
journal referee allegedly stole information and used it in a patent application.
So once again, my message is simply be aware these dangers are out there, and
they may be exacerbated by the pursuit of patent rights.
43. I will now move to the second topic. Collaboration is very important
in many biotech fields and probably will be important in biomaterials.

' See NIH, NIH Director's Statement on Research Using Stem Cells -12/1/99 (last
modified Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/draftguidelines.htm>.
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
10TP Labs. v. Prof'l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
" Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 870 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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Collaboration occurs between universities, start-ups or small biotech firms, and
large pharmaceutical firms. I want to comment on the motivation of these
different parties when it comes to patents and commercialization of biotech
inventions.
First, there are technology transfer offices in universities.
Actually, I will have more to tell you about descriptive details about how
technology transfer offices work, and the role of patents in universities. First,
there are just a few comments I want to make.
44. I want to report some empirical work that describes the behavior of
technology transfer offices, and reveals a keen interest in biotech collaboration.
Research indicates that technology transfer officers think that only about
twelve percent of the technology that they license is ready for
commercialization. 1 2 Most of what they license not only is not ready to be
commercialized but it requires on-going cooperation by faculty if there's any
real hope of commercializing the technology. 13 Universities are willing to
work with companies to achieve that goal. Technology transfer officers
indicate that royalty maximization and diffusion of technology are their two
primary goals in managing university technology transfer.
45. They also indicate that in about eighty percent of these licenses there is
some kind of profit-sharing arrangement. Many of them include output- or
sales-based royalties, but also equity stakes are becoming increasingly
common. One motivation for profit-sharing is to align the incentives of the
university and the university-based inventor with the licensee and focus all the
parties on the goal of commercialization of the technology.
46. There are a lot of difficult issues faced by start-ups with regard to
commercializing their patented technology. The basic problem, I suppose, is
that patent licenses that they derive from universities or from other sources
transfer certain patented information disclosures that are made in patent grants.
But, anybody with experience in the field knows that know-how is very
important, and it is difficult to get the know-how transferred. Trade secret
licenses are possible. But, really the key in a lot of biotech firms is moving
people around, because tacit knowledge can't be communicated very easily
any other way. So what you find is that you end up with not only this formal
licensing relationship between start-ups and universities, but you see faculty
moving back and forth to start-ups. If you are advising the start-up and you are
looking at these talented scientists that are moving in and may soon be moving
out of the company, you have to be concerned about whether they will go and
work for one of your competitors, or whether they will take trade secrets with
them when they go.
47. So a word of advice to attorneys that are thinking about this issue is
12 See RICHARD JENSEN & MARIE THURSBY, PROOFS AND PROTOTYPES FOR SALE: THE
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5 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.

6698, 1998).
13 See id. at 6 ("For 71% of the inventions licensed, respondents claim successful
commercialization requires cooperation by the faculty inventor and the licensee in further
development.").
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that you have to make sure that you negotiate something that will be
satisfactory to both sides. A difficult issue, but something that is central in
planning employment relationships in these start-up companies, is the high
degree of mobility of people with special talents. In fact, empirical researchers
comment that star scientists play a key role in the success of start-ups.
Extensive research by Zucker and Darby shows that the rate of new product
introduction is critically related to the presence of a star academic researcher in
a biotech company.1 4 They also find that geographic proximity to the
university where the stars reside is important to the success of the small
biotech firms. Beyond that, you want to maintain a kind of culture of science
within your start-up. It makes it more attractive to the stars. They have their
chance to publish and they view the start-up as being more credible if it seems
like it is not too distant from the community of academic science.
48. I have one last point looking in the other direction. So far I have
spoken about the relationship between start-ups and universities. I have less to
say, but it is also very important to pay attention to the relationships between
start-ups and large firms, pharmaceutical companies. Financing over the '80s
and the '90s for biotech firms has been extremely volatile. 15 There have been
good days but there have also been bad days. It does not look like the
financing history of the dot-coins. An alternative to going out and raising your
own capital is striking up some kind of alliance. It is very common to have
alliances between biotech firms and the pharmaceutical firms. When start-ups
contemplate such alliances, they should think about questions like: "Who's
going to control patent litigation? What kind of know-how transfers are going
to be made from the small firm to the big firm? And can you maintain your
academic culture within your small firm, even though many of the big
companies are skeptical about allowing publication?" You want to continue
with academic publications because you want to impress your financiers, and
you want to keep your academic researchers happy.
49. There is a fair amount of empirical evidence that says that there are
some big pharmaceutical companies that have gotten the message and there are
some that have not. Some have a pretty sophisticated research organization
that seems to emulate the model of academic science, and other research
groups and pharmaceutical companies are more constrained. The empirical
evidence shows that there is a high value to pharmaceutical companies of
having co-authorship links with people in academic science. 1 6 There is an
14See Lynne G. Zucker et al., Geographically Localized Knowledge: Spillovers or
Markets? 36 ECON.
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65 (1998).

15 See JOSH LERNER & ROBERT P. MERGES, THE CONTROL OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY COLLABORATIONS

Research Working Paper No. 6014, 1997).
16 See AIN COCKBURN & REBECCA HENDERSON,
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indication that the research productivity difference is thirty to forty percent. It
is higher in companies that maintain close relationships with the academic
community. The value of that close relationship is that you are better able to
recognize upstream development and you are going to see new research
opportunities earlier. In order to create a kind of an academic science culture
within these large corporations, you need to take the chances that some of the
lawyers in the pharmaceutical companies have been counseling against. You
need to let your researchers publish, you need to let them attend academic
conferences, and you need to reward them based on their standing in the
academic community. The companies that have done that, as well as establish
the co-authorship links, are the ones that appear to have been the most
successful in terms of moving new products to market and success in terms of
research productivity.
50. The last thing to consider is the point that I made before with small
firms, that if you want to establish an academic culture within your large firm,
you are going to face the same kinds of problems of, or heightened problems
of, employee mobility: concern about departure of key employees and the
possibility that they will take trade secrets with them.
51. The final topic that I want to talk about is patent litigation in the
biotech world. The message here is fairly simple. First of all, frequency of
litigation and the cost of litigation for biotech patents is very high. Drug and
health patents are litigated more than any other kind of technology. There is
one empirical study that showed that six lawsuits are spawned by every 100
corporate biotech patents. 17 There is also research that shows that most of the
start-up companies are spending a comparable amount on legal costs to what
they are spending on research. 18 So this is a very big concern for start-up
companies.
52. A second issue is that the market surrounding litigation is becoming
more sophisticated. You will find that there are financial products available
that allow investors to buy into ownership of patents for the purpose of funding
litigation and you will find that there is also a nascent patent enforcement
insurance market developing; an indication of the great costs involved and the
significance of the litigation in this area. Significantly, the research agendas in
a large impact on research productivity.").
1 See Josh Lerner, The Importance of Trade Secrecy: Evidence from Civil Litigation,

paper presented to the Conference on the Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, ICARE
Institute, University of Venice, Italy (October 6-8, 1994).
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small biotech companies are influenced by these litigation costs. There is
empirical evidence that the smaller start-ups with less financial resources direct
their research in such a way that they avoid fields crowded with many patents
and fields that are likely to generate a lot of litigation. 19
53. The final comment that I want to make, something that is a particularly
significant issue when you are talking about collaboration between a firm and a
university, specifically a state university, is that recent cases involving the
Eleventh Amendment 20 have made it difficult to challenge the validity of a
patent held by a state university. 21 Firms that normally insist on patent
ownership might let a state university retain patent rights. On the other hand,
when you are looking to enforce patent rights, you might have to worry about
infringement by laboratories in state universities. The university might be
sheltered, and they're the deep pockets, the organization that you would like to
name as plaintiff-you'll end up though, choosing the university researcher as
a target, and you may be able to sue the individual researcher to stop them
from infringing on your patented technology. As Thomas Meyers said a few
minutes ago, that might not be the best move in terms of public relations. The
last thing I'll say is keep an eye on legislation that is pending. Congress may
try to react to this issue; it is an important consideration since state universities
will be the source of a lot of biomaterials patents.
Dr. Ashley Stevens:
54. Thank you very much Michael. I'm going to talk on four topics
briefly. First, I'll talk about the Bayh-Dole Act,22 which started universities
out in the patenting business. Second, I'll talk a little bit about universities'
approach to patenting; third, about their approach to licensing; and finally,
their approach to start-ups.
55. I'll start with a little history. I won't go back a million B.C., but I'll go
back to 1945. During the Second World War, the government had intervened
in the creation of science for the first time. The Manhattan Project, the
Penicillin Project, and the microwave radar projects had proven that the
government could direct science and produce results. This led to Vannevar
19 See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J. L. & EcON. 463, 465

(1995) ("[P]atenting behavior of firms varies with litigation costs ....
When highlitigation-cost firms do patent in subclasses in which rival biotechnology firms have already
patented, they tend to choose less crowded subclasses.").
20 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
21 See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (invalidating Patent Remedy Act, which abrogated States' sovereign
immunity to patent infringement suits, on Fourteenth Amendment grounds); Robert G.
Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amendment & University-Private Sector
IntellectualProperty Relationships (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
22 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (1994)).
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Bush and his Endless Frontiers Report, 23 which resulted in the growth of the
government-funded, peer-reviewed system that has driven the development of
science since the Second World War. Now, it turned out that that move had
some side effects. Government was funding the science, therefore government
owned the results of the science. Fast-forward to 1965 or so, and a situation
that occurred at the University of Wisconsin concerning 5-fluorouracil (5FU),
still a major drug in cancer chemotherapy today. Most of the research had
been funded by a drug company and the government had put in, on final
examination, minimal funding. Yet the government asserted that they owned
the entire rights to 5FU, and that they had policies of non-exclusively licensing
technologies. This resulted in a "Chinese Wall" between academic and
industrial science, when research was said to be "contaminated" by federal
funding.
56. Fast-forward again to 1978. This was a time when there were severe
concerns about U.S. industrial competitiveness, fears about European and
Japanese economic supremacy, and the government was looking for ways to
enhance U.S. economic competitiveness, and they found that cases like 5FU
had isolated academic research from industrial application. One of the
solutions was to change the ownership rules of academic intellectual property.
They looked for ways to reverse this and so the Bayh-Dole Act, a bipartisan
bill sponsored by Senators Birch Bayh (D, Indiana) and Robert Dole (R,
Kansas), was born. They found in 1978 that the government owned 28,000
patents and had been successful in licensing only four percent of them. Part of
the reason was philosophical - they had this philosophy of only nonexclusively licensing patents. Another part was a practical one. As Michael
said, and I firmly believe, for successful translation of academic science, the
inventor has to stay involved with the project. So in the pre-Bayh-Dole era,
you had the government in Washington through the NTIS owning the patent
and the universities controlling access to the researcher. The two just did not
get together. The Bayh-Dole Act was passed and it removed a number of
things. It removed restrictions on exclusivity. Initially there was a partial
removal; soon afterwards, all restrictions on exclusivity were removed. It
allowed universities to elect title to patents if they wanted to. If you look at
U.S. patents, in about three to four percent of them, you will see the first
paragraph after the abstract says that this invention was funded in part by a
contract from the government and the government may have certain rights in it.
That meant it was an academic patent funded by a grant.
57. The government retained a nonexclusive license for its own use. It
required the product sold in the U.S. be manufactured in the U.S., so the U.S.
economy would benefit. The invention couldn't be made with government
funding and shipped overseas for cheap manufacture; rather, the U.S.
manufacturing sector would benefit. It required that universities share the
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income with the inventor to provide an incentive to participate in the process.
Putting, I might say, U.S. academics in a class where their only peer group is
Germany - where there are laws that require firms to share with employees
profits from their patents.
58. Finally, there was a walk-in provision whereby if the government felt
that the patents weren't being managed in the public interest, they could grant
compulsory licenses. This issue was tested very thoroughly in the case of
Johns Hopkins v. CelPro, where after a protracted debate, Harold Varmus
decided to enforce Johns Hopkins's patent against CellPro. 24 Johns Hopkins
sued CellPro for infringement of their basic patents on CD34. CellPro lost
thoroughly in court, and then as a final attempt applied to the NIH for a
compulsory license; Varmus declined it, and CellPro promptly shut down.
59. The Bayh-Dole Act was passed in 1980. It wasn't the only structural
change taking place at that time. There were several other important changes a series of court cases that extended patents to living organisms: Chakrabarty
26
25
extending it to microorganisms, Ex parte Hibberd extending it to plants,
and the Leder patent extending patent protection to animals. 27 A critical factor
was the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which
created a uniform national court of appeal on patent matters. There were
changes on the financial side as well - changes in the Prudent Man rules of
investment and reduction in capital gains taxes which stimulated the
development of the venture capital industry that Rufus King documented so
28
dramatically earlier today.
60. The result has been that universities have participated, and been major
contributors, to the growth of a number of industries - clearly, the
biotechnology industry. You can also look at the growth of the Internet and
see that all aspects of the Internet were incubated in the academic sector,
developed initially in the defense sector, and later moved under the control of
the NSF and into the university sector. This year's survey from the Association
of University Technology Managers shows that the universities, teaching
hospitals and independent research institutes collectively received royalty
income last year of $800 million, which sounds like an awful lot. But when
you start thinking about it, universities, which typically receive two to five
percent royalties on sales under their licenses are receiving this much, what is
the total economic impact on the country? You can see that there is probably
$25-30 billion in commercial activity and 250,000 jobs in the economy today
that are direct consequences of academic technology.
61. Next, I'll talk a little about universities' patenting activity. First,
universities look upon patents as protectors of academic freedom, not as

24 See John Hopkins v. CellPro, 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
25 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
26 See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985).
27 U.S. Patent No. 5,925,803.
28 See Wong et al., supra note 1,

62-72.
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inhibitors of it. After all, the whole essence of a patent is that it allows you to
publish your ideas while retaining your intellectual property position in them.
Therefore, we encourage researchers, if they think their research has
commercial potential, to patent it so that they can go on and be good
academics, publish and collaborate and not feel obliged to keep their
knowledge to themselves. Next, I would say that universities recognize that
their technology is embryonic in nature. I wish that twelve percent of my
inventions were immediately ready for prime time. They almost universally
require some development. A study out of the University of California ("UC")
a number of years ago showed that UC doesn't start to realize significant
revenue from a license until it's been in existence for eight years. Certainly,
you can look at some sectors where that term is even longer. Gene therapy,
which is in the news so much today, is an example. It was in 1986, fourteen
years ago, that French Anderson and Steve Rosenberg started their work; still
there is not an approved gene therapy product, although there are some now in
Phase III. Our own experience with Serogen was that immunotheraputics took
seventeen years for the first product, ONTAK, to get to the marketplace,
although certainly it is selling well now. Given both the embryonic nature and
the long lead time, a lot of what universities do in their patenting strategies is
targeted cost containment, minimizing expenditures and maximizing protection
while you try to get the technology assessed and evaluated so that you can see
what its potential is going to be.
62. We love provisional patent applications, which arrived in 1995. They
have been a godsend to universities. Generally, when we have been able to
contact the researcher or he contacted us before the initial publication came
out, we use the PCT system to stake out foreign protection. Then there is that
terrible eighteen month deadline down the road for national phase entry. I
would say that in general, universities will not enter national phase overseas
without a licensee in place to reimburse the costs.
63. Going on to how universities look at licensing, I would say that we
generally do license. Often companies come to us and ask us to assign the
patents to them. I would say that there is a great resistance to that.
64. To pick up on Michael Meurer's point on state universities, there are
certain restraints on states. However, there are equal restraints on states in
licensing. For example, you cannot bind states to arbitration, which many
licensing agreements require. A number of state universities have set up a
research foundation that is independent as 501 (c)(3) corporations and not part
of the state which owns the patents. These foundations may not have those
protections that a state itself would.
65. One of the biggest concerns of a university is that most licenses tend to
be exclusive, in which the university gives up control of its technology
completely. Therefore, the university is very concerned about due diligence making sure that the licensee is going to put a serious effort into developing
the technology. A lot of negotiations that take place involve due diligence, and
the ultimate arbiter of due diligence is annual minimum royalties kicking in
quite early to ensure that the technology has significant value to the licensee
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and that they are prepared to make $10,000, $25,000 or $50,000 payments
each year to keep their rights. We do acknowledge that as the technology
leaves the university, its potential is great but its proof is limited. Therefore,
perhaps the present value is not great. We will therefore share in the risk of the
value of technology proving out either by taking an equity stake in the
company if the company is at the appropriate stage or through a series of
milestone payments in which, as the technology is proven out, we receive cash
payments from the licensee reflecting this increase. Then, in terms of the value
that is being contributed up front, since most of these inventions have been
funded by grants, which we have no obligation to repay, the need for
reimbursement of sunk costs is generally limited to the costs of patenting.
66. I'll make a couple of observations specific to the medical device area.
Boston University has twice gone through cycles in which we licensed a
medical device patent to a mid-size device manufacturer, which a few years
down the road, was acquired by a large device company. The development
project we had with the original licensee didn't meet the development criteria
of the large company, and the license was terminated. So we got back a device
which was well-prototyped, had good animal data, and had issued patents. We
have been successful in licensing these to young start-up companies that were
delighted with the well-developed technology that we were able to give them
and were able to do an attractive deal. Medical device patents have an enduring
value.
67. On the issue of university-sponsored start-ups, there is a spectrum of
involvement with the university. The involvement can be nonexistent. At
most universities, faculty members have the right to consult one day a week
with third parties. He or she could dedicate that day to helping found a
company to develop one of his or her ideas. We might know very little about
it. The next level of involvement is where the invention has been disclosed to
the university and the university has licensed it and taken an equity stake in the
licensee. Some universities have the ability to invest and then even go to
levels of involvement like incubation and even participating in the
development phase. Boston University has a very prominent activity in that
area through our Photonics Center, where we have a very active program of
incubating both companies that come to us from the outside and companies
29
that are spawned from our own technology.
68. I'll conclude by saying a little about the Community Technology Fund,
which I am part of. It's a fairly unusual organization in academia. We do four
things for Boston University. First of all, we advise the managers of Boston
University's endowment on investing a small part of the endowment in venture
capital limited partnerships. Second, we manage a venture capital pool of
uncertain value. On December 31, we were worth about thirty-five million
dollars, but with all the current biotech and high-tech IPOs, I'm not sure what
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the value of our fund will be at the end of this quarter. We invest directly in
early stage companies - biotech and information technologies (both those that
come from Boston University and those that have no involvement in Boston
University). The third function we have is taking a proactive role in starting
companies. A faculty member can come to us and say that he wants to start a
company in this area, but doesn't have the necessary resources. Finally, we do
technology transfer. We represent both campuses of the University and in a
somewhat unusual move, we also represent our affiliated teaching hospital,
Boston University Medical Center.
69. We're very proud of one of our spin-out companies, a company called
Sequenom, founded on technology developed by Charles Cantor of Boston
University and Hubert Koster of the University of Hamburg. This is a unique
trans-Atlantic collaboration. This company has just gone public, and is
developing technology for high-throughput genotyping of individuals' DNA.
This company went public late last month, and is currently valued at about $1
billion.
70. This concludes my remarks. We have about five or ten minutes to take
questions.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

Audience Member:
71. On the topic of academic patenting, will there be a problem with
relatively new statutory development that would allow the public to reach into
federally funded research under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
including non-profit funding?
Dr. Ashley Stevens:
72. I think you would be able to claim confidential treatment for
proprietary information under FOIA.
Dr. Martin Yarmush:
73. I wanted to comment on the slides addressing the academic nature of
companies. I think there are as many cases of failures of companies following
that model as successes, meaning that if you have an academic star as opposed
to an academic center, sometimes it doesn't work just because of those things.
I think in those cases it's a good thing gone bad, where placement has become
too academic. I think the nature of the successes has been where there has
been a natural balance between industrial goals as well as the academic culture.
The other thing I just wanted to make a point about involves universities versus
health centers. I come from the MGH, and they're very interested in licensing
and patenting. However, the mandate there is really that if the physician has
something that's useful for the patient population, it's their obligation to get
that out there for all patients and the only vehicle is really through industrial
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development. That sounds nice and if it works out that way, it's great.
74. I have a problem with universities and the Bayh-Dole Act, where
basically the goal is not so much to get it out there for the patient population.
There is an equal and opposite drive to make money for the university, which
puts it into a different framework. If it's commercializable and can make a lot
of money, we go forward with it. But in the case of the health center, it's more
an issue of will it help the patients. I would like to hear a comment from a
resident university technology transfer officer to see if they see a difference
between the two.
Dr. Ashley Stevens:
75. No, I don't think we do. I think that if we want the invention to be
commercialized, it needs to be patented and protected. I think the universities
have a legitimate right to participate and share in that income. As I remarked
earlier, typically 95 percent of the benefit goes to the commercial partner and
five percent, if you're lucky, goes back to the university.
Dr. Martin Yarmush:
76. But I am willing to change the Bayh-Dole Act and say that universities
own nothing. They contributed nothing to the invention at all. It was funded
by the government, it was worked on by myself and colleagues. What did the
University do besides providing rent, which is paid for by overhead? I realize
that we have to tag the obligation on somebody out there, but I'm not sure that
universities are the ones I would have given it to.
Prof.Michael Meurer:
77. I agree with the comment. I don't want to oversell the academic model
for research in industry. What I observed based on these studies was the
correlation - I admit that the studies don't establish a causal relationship.
There is a lot of anecdotal evidence, a lot of indirect evidence that suggests that
it's very important to stay in touch with academic science, and promoting this
academic model within corporations is a good start at doing that. But I
certainly agree that you can't forget that ultimately you've got to roll products
out, and appropriate standards need to be put into place to accomplish that.
There are these twin goals and certainly some of the pharmaceutical companies
have failed to maintain incentives to product development in striving to put the
academic model into place.
Dr. Ashley Stevens:
78. I think what I hear you saying is an argument I hear a lot from faculty,
which is "I did this. This is my invention. What did the university do?" I
think the answer is the university had the wisdom to hire you, it had the
wisdom to provide you with your laboratory, it may have had the wisdom to
supply you with start-up funding. I don't think the university would make any
claim to an invention that you made in your garage or your cellar with funds
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that you raised independently such as through the SBIR program, which is
certainly feasible. But when the invention is made in the mainstream of your
academic practice, then you made a deal when you joined the university. You
signed an assignment agreement which said that in return for a risk-free share
of X percent of the income, I assign you the rights. A deal is a deal.
Steven Bauer:
79. If I can give three comparative models and you can see between
Harvard and MIT as examples. I'm not so familiar with BU, but you can see
the real difference between them in this sense. MIT owns the patents coming
out of its research. But the media lab model is different compared to the MIT
model. MIT generally can grant exclusive licenses because it's from its
technology, except for the information coming out of the media lab. The
media lab has a model that's a communist versus a capitalist model. The
Media Lab model is anybody who invests in the Media Lab gets access to all
the technology non-exclusively. I've been told that it's sad in that the Media
Lab gets all this great technology, but there isn't a lot of technology spinning
out of the Media Lab. That's because no one can get exclusive rights. You
compare that to the rest of MIT and the entrepreneurial entity that it is, and it's
because they can grant exclusive rights. Similarly, at Harvard, you have a
good comparison of the model. In that instance, my understanding is that
Harvard owns all patents or technology that are health-care related. For some
reason, Harvard doesn't own in the first instance technology that comes out of
non-health-related areas. You see big differences in that area in terms of the
technology being spun off. When the university doesn't own it, the researcher
is going to have to pay the patent application cost himself. Where you're
doing fundamental research, you're not going to see a technology come out
five years from now and you're publishing, no faculty member is going to
spend $15,000 of his or her own money to get a patent now that might have
value five years from now. The university is willing to pay $15,000 for the
patent now, put it away in its portfolio, allow the researcher to continue
researching for the next five years, and then when the technology is developed,
there is going to be some profit or royalty availability. There will be a patent
there to take advantage of.
Dr. Martin Yarmush:
80. The alternative that I would like to see is not so much to exclude the
others, but where the people who fund it own the patents. So if I want to
assign rights to the company that's out there, I'm probably violating some
major issues, but that's the way I see the entire system; being funneled or
fueled by the industry that paid for it and getting the patent in return. They
will be more likely to fund research in the future to get more patents.
Dr. Ashley Stevens:
81. That exists today. If a company funds research, a standard component
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of a sponsored research agreement is an exclusive option to an exclusive
license. The reason that we do it that way is that universities do their research
for cost. We don't make a profit on the research. We ask what the direct costs
of doing the research are, what the indirect costs are, and that's what we charge
people. If you go to somebody like Arthur D. Little, or SRI, they don't charge
costs. Yes, they will give you the results so that you can own the patent, but
they will charge you the cost of the research and a profit margin on top.
Universities don't do it that way. We charge cost and the profit comes from
the income from licensing to the sponsor, if the technology is successful. But
the company that has funded the research has exclusive access to the results of
the research.
Dr. Martin Yarmush:
82. But one way that you could do that is by funneling in a separate
overhead for those people who actually want to own the patents. In other
words, you get your profits through doubling your overhead and then the
company can own the profit. I think that would be the most robust method of
funding research in the long run. It's an alternative.
Audience Member:
83. Regarding the intellectual property of biomaterials, it's been my
experience that with virtually all smaller companies and to a greater extent
most larger companies as well, very few companies are willing to use or even
try to develop newer biomaterials in a medical device because it complicates
the path tremendously. From a regulatory perspective, you have to qualify the
new material and then, assuming that you are able to do that, you have to then
get the device approved. There is also additional time that's involved so that it
makes the deal quite a bit more risky. Academic research aside, I'm
wondering what are some of the issues specifically related to industry
regarding the use of some of these newer, more novel biomaterials closer to the
biological materials and how are they going to impact industry needs?
Thomas Meyers:
84. I don't know whether I agree with the question with respect to the
move to get approval as a rate-limiting step. I'm not sure that that has a big
impact on industry. It has somewhat of an impact, but I'm not sure that it has
as big an impact as you suggest.
Audience Member:
85. But if you don't get something approved, you can't market it.
Thomas Meyers:
86. It's true that if you don't get something approved, then you've got a
problem down stream. But I don't think that impacts the decisions that
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companies are making, at least from what we see in the short term. They're
always thinking about that in the backs of their minds. We will be hearing
from people later this afternoon who might have more direct data, but I don't
see, with the companies that we work with, that being a step that stops them
from incorporating biomaterials into the devices that they're working with.
Audience Member:
87. New materials - non-existing materials. One of the best cases is how
long it's taken us to develop an FDA database of approved materials. This has
been going on for three decades, and we still don't have a good one.
Thomas Meyers:
88. There isn't a lot that you can look at and say that this is something that
we can get approval for without a fight. I don't specialize in FDA law, so I
can't comment on the statistics. What I can comment on from a patent point of
view is that it's not stopping people from pursuing patents. It's not stopping
people from doing research. When somebody comes up with an idea, they are
not saying that because it's going to be a long road on the way to approval,
they're going to discard it.
Audience Member:
89. On the medical device side? I think it's different from the biotech
side. One of the fundamental differences between the medical device industry
and the biotech industry is the time-lines. Medical devices have a much
shorter time to market than a biotech or a drug product.
Thomas Meyers:
90. That's right, because there is that database for approvals on the
medical device side that doesn't exist on the biotech side, but on the biotech
side I don't see it as a major impediment for the people that we work with.
Audience Member:
91. I would agree that it might not be an impediment on the biotech side,
but I think it is an impediment on the device side.
Thomas Meyers:
92. I would agree.
Dr. Ashley Stevens:
93. You heard what Josh Tolkoff said earlier this morning. It has been the
breast implant litigation that's done it. When Dow Chemical can be sued for
the activities of an independent joint venture company that it's set up, that puts
a severe chill over all novel biomedical materials. I think Congress has started
a trend and addressed this. I forget what the legislation providing an
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exemption is, but it's still providing a chill.
Audience Member:
94. I think that's an excellent example, because today all but two suppliers
of medical-grade silicones have been driven out of the marketplace. Even in
suppliers of other biomaterials, oftentimes they are asking for $1 billion
indemnification before they will allow you to use their materials. If you're a
small company, that's just not a possibility.
Dr. Ashley Stevens:
95. I would like to thank the Panelists and wish you a good lunch.

